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quarters. I also show that, controlling for earnings announcements in the same month, volatility does not increase during months that include dividend announcements and the effect of dividend announcements does not vary by quarter.
I then use the variation in Þscal year ends, which makes it possible to separately identify the effects of calendar and Þscal seasonality on stock prices and stock volatility, to show that earnings announcements make volatility higher in certain months of the average Þrm's Þscal years.
SpeciÞcally, volatility increases signiÞcantly in the fourth, seventh, tenth, and, to a lesser extent, Þrst months of the Þscal year. Since it typically contains the Þrst earnings announcement, volatility is particularly high in the fourth Þscal month. I then go on to show that investors are rewarded for bearing this extra risk by a small but signiÞcant premium during the fourth Þscal month.
If Þscal year ends were evenly distributed throughout calendar years, then Þscal year effects on volatility would not affect the aggregate market's volatility in a predictable manner. But because most Þrms have Þscal years that coincide with the calendar year, earnings announcements are bunched in certain calendar months. I estimate the additional volatility in these months that results from Þscal year patterns. In particular, volatility is slightly higher in January, July, October, and, especially, April, than it would be if Þscal year ends were randomly distributed.
While explaining the additional volatility in earnings announcement months is not difficult, it is not immediately obvious why the Þrst quarter announcement should be more important than other announcements. I use Zacks data on brokerage Þrm analyst forecasts to investigate a possible link between volatility in the fourth Þscal month and the cyclical behavior of analysts. I Þnd some evidence to suggest that analysts are a contributing factor to the additional volatility surrounding earnings announcements. More speciÞcally, Þrst quarter announcements appear to lead to bigger changes in forecasts, are more frequently followed by new forecasts, and may lead to bigger surprises since Þrst quarter forecasts are less frequently updated during the quarter.
The results suggest that earnings announcements are by far the biggest regular and predictable cause of stock volatility, and that analyst activity in response to earnings announcements exacerbates this effect. As a result, volatility changes throughout the Þscal and calendar years in a somewhat predictable manner. However, even when controlling for Þrm and industry speciÞc effects, the calendar month and Þscal month explain very little of the variation in stock volatility.
While earnings announcements increase volatility, they only explain a trivial portion of total volatility. Other non-recurring and unpredictable sources of information cause the vast majority of stock volatility.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and the measures of stock return and volatility. Section 3 measures how volatility differs in months with earnings and dividend announcements. Section 4 determines how the effects of earnings announcements lead to patterns in volatility and stock returns throughout the Þscal year and Section 5 shows that Þscal year patterns affect the calendar seasonality of aggregate stock market volatility. The role of equity analysts in Þscal year stock trends is explored in Section 6 by describing when analysts make and update their forecasts. Section 7 concludes and suggests directions for follow-up research.
Data and Measurement
The Þrst sources of data are Standard and Poor's Compustat annual research, industrial, and full coverage Þles, from which I gathered Þrms' annual sales, Þscal year end, and primary SIC code. I use Compustat's primary SIC codes, rather than those from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP), because they have been shown to be more reliable (see Guenther and Rosman (1994) .) In order to focus on established Þrms, I include only companies in which annual sales exceeded $10 million for at least four of the years from 1986 to 1995. To make the Þrms within an SIC code more likely to be comparable, I only consider manufacturing Þrms (SIC codes 2000 to 3999.)
The Compustat SIC codes and Þscal year ends were matched with Þscal 1986-1994 daily stock return (including dividends) data from CRSP. I then converted the return data into month variables, as detailed below, dropping any Þrm-month that did not have at least twelve days of trading data available. To keep the sample balanced, I dropped observations when data was not available for all twelve months of the Þscal year. I also dropped Þrm-years when the dates of quarterly earnings announcements were unavailable in Compustat.
Let r ijt be the dividend-adjusted percentage return for date t, where Þrm i's primary SIC code is j. Then the excess return of Þrm i's stock on date t can be written
By using industry average return, instead of risk-adjusted market-wide return, I hope to factor out the common risks, news, and seasonal effects of an industry. To insure that the comparison group is sufficiently large, I only use date-company observations when I have data for at least Þve Þrms with the same four-digit SIC code.
The bulk of the analysis focuses on volatility, as measured by the Standard Deviation of Daily Excess Return (SDDER) within a month. 1 I also examine returns over the course of the month by looking at Average Daily Excess Return (ADER), the geometric average of a Þrm's percentage daily excess returns within a month. More speciÞcally, these variables are deÞned as:
where m is the set of trading days (t) in a given month.
Volatility in Months with Announcements
I start by formally testing Chari et al.'s (1988) speculation that, "portfolio returns generally are likely to behave differently during the four calendar months in which most earnings announcements are made." I also consider dividend announcements, since Aharony and Swary (1980) and others have shown volatility increases near such announcements.
I employ an empirical method that allows comparison of how SDDER is affected by the two different types of announcements, as well as comparison among the different Þscal quarters. If there are calendar effects in the volatility of a Þrm's stock return (caused by the calendar business cycle, the concentration of industry announcements in a certain time of the year, or other reasons), then these effects are likely to be present in SDDER. However, as long as there is variation in the Þscal year end of the companies within an industry, then I can use the empirical framework from Oyer (1998) to separately identify the effects of the calendar year and announcements on an average Þrm's SDDER. Table 1 shows the distribution of Þscal year ends by company. While half the companies align their Þscal year with the calendar, there is substantial variation among the other companies.
Consider the Þrms within a single industry (that is, hold j Þxed in equations (2) and (3)). Let v im represent the volatility of Þrm i's stock price (SDDER) in month m. Assume that volatility in a given m is affected by the calendar month, η, and any announcements the Þrm makes during the month. Therefore, volatility can be expressed as
where α i represents a Þrm Þxed effect, c η is the industry-wide calendar volatility effect of month η. given an average volatility of about 3%, suggests that volatility increases by about one-Þfteenth in earnings months. The magnitude and signiÞcance of this coefficient make it clear that earnings announcements have very signiÞcant effects on the stock market.
Dividend declarations, however, do not add volatility to a Þrm's stock, once I control for earnings announcement. In fact, volatility is signiÞcantly lower in months that include a dividend declaration. This may be partially due to the colinearity of dividend and earnings announcements making it difficult to quantify the dividend effect. It could also indicate that the Þxed effect model does not perfectly capture the within-Þrm differences in volatility. That is, if a given Þrm adds a dividend at the same time as its stock becomes less volatile, the dividend coefficient in Table   2 would be somewhat understated. Nevertheless, it seems clear that dividend announcements do not have a strong effect on volatility over the course of a month and that dividend announcements cause far less volatility than earnings announcements.
As mentioned previously, one of the weaknesses of the traditional event studies of earnings announcements is that they do not allow proper comparisons of the differential impact of various quarters' announcements. This is because there are underlying calendar seasonality effects that are not removed from such studies. However, adding quarterly announcement variables to regressions using the equation (4) speciÞcation allows for comparison among quarters. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the results of a regression that interacts each type of announcement variable with Þscal quarter 2, 3, and 4 indicator variables. The excluded category is the Þrst Þscal quarter. The coefficient on the interaction of earnings announcement with second quarter measures the amount by which the SDDER in a month where a second quarter announcement is made differs, holding the industry's calendar volatility constant, from the volatility in a month with a Þrst quarter earnings announcement.
Allowing the effects of Þscal quarters to differ adds explanatory power to the regression and exposes signiÞcant differences among the four earnings announcements. In particular, months that include Þrst quarter earnings announcement are more volatile than any other and this difference is statistically signiÞcant. While the "average" earnings announcement increases SDDER by 0.2%, Þrst quarter announcements increase SDDER by 0.25% compared to SDDER increases averaging 0.18% for other announcements. This suggests that there is something fundamentally different about Þrst quarter earnings announcements that lead them to add more volatility than the other quarterly announcements.
The relative importance of the Þrst quarter announcement is somewhat surprising. Oyer (1998) showed that, on average and holding calendar seasonality constant, quarterly revenues increase as the Þscal year progresses. Callen, Livnat and Ryan (1996) showed that capital expenditures also increase throughout the Þscal year. This might suggest that there is more information in each earnings announcement as the year progresses since higher revenues and capital expenditures are likely to produce more variable accounting performance. However, the Þrst quarter announcement comes shortly after the release of annual detailed Þnancial reports, especially the 10-K. A signiÞcant majority of Þrms release 10-K's in the latter part of the third Þscal month and, despite an SECimposed ninety day deadline, many Þrms release their 10-K in the fourth Þscal month (see Alford, Jones and Zmijewski (1994) ). Also, Stickel (1989) shows that "analysts avoid revising for two weeks before an interim announcement and frequently revise immediately after an announcement." This suggests that, assuming an important audience for 10-K reports is the security analyst community, 10-K's are typically released too late to affect analyst forecasts before the release of Þrst-quarter earnings announcements. Therefore, analysts may wait and incorporate the information in 10-K's into the forecasts they make after the Þrst-quarter earnings announcement. Section 6 below investigates the role of analysts in stock volatility over the Þscal year in more detail.
Volatility and Returns Over the Fiscal Year
Since earnings announcements are spaced predictably over the Þscal year, it seems likely that the increase in volatility near announcements will lead to increases in volatility during certain months of the Þscal year. Roughly three-quarters of large Þrm interim quarterly earnings announcements As expected, there are spikes in volatility at each of the Þscal months that is likely to contain an earnings announcement -the Þrst, fourth, seventh, and tenth. This pattern holds for each group in the graph. Though slightly harder to detect visually, the graph also suggests that the largest of these spikes is in the fourth Þscal month -the month of most Þrst quarter earnings announcements. 3
In general, Figure 1 suggests that there are Þscal year patterns in stock volatility and that earnings announcements are a key driver of these patterns.
To more formally analyze the volatility by Þscal month, I use a minor modiÞcation to the approach in (4). Now assume that volatility in a given m is affected by the calendar month, η, and the month in the Þrm's Þscal year, p. 4 Therefore, volatility can be expressed as
where f p is the industry-wide effect of being in Þscal month p, the "d" terms are indicator variables for Þscal and calendar months, and the other variables are as above.
The coefficient of interest is f p , the "Þscal-month effect" in month p. I omit the twelfth-Þscal-month indicator variable from the regression, so the twelfth month is the base month for interpreting the other Þscal-month effects. f p measures the amount by which the standard deviation of daily excess returns in the p'th Þscal month differs, holding the industry's calendar volatility constant, from the volatility in the twelfth Þscal month. Table 3 displays all the f and d terms from estimating (5) on the sample that was used to estimate the announcement effects. Several observations are immediately apparent. First, the rsquare of the regression is less than two percent. Many of the coefficients of the regression are signiÞcant and an F-test rejects the hypothesis that this regression has no explanatory power.
However, calendar and Þscal-year patterns explain only a trivial portion of the variation in stock volatility. Even after accounting for industry-wide shocks, the overwhelming majority of month-tomonth variation in individual stocks' SDDER is due to idiosyncratic, unscheduled factors. 3 Volatility does not peak in the fourth month for all Þscal year ends, but, as will be shown below, this is because the graph does not remove the October jump in volatility. Also, the graph makes it clear that volatility is, on average, noticeably lower at calendar Þscal year companies than other companies. This is due to the choice of a calendar Þscal year being positively correlated with size (see Huberman and Kandel (1989) .) While this might lead to worries that using Þscal year variation leads to inappropriate comparisons between calendar and non-calendar Þrms, I have redone all the analysis in the paper excluding calendar Þscal year companies and it has no effect on the results.
generally, the period from March to September is a period of relatively low volatility, while October through January show signiÞcantly higher average volatility.
Turning to the Þscal calendar, the importance of the Þrst Þscal quarter earnings announcement is reinforced by the additional volatility in and around the fourth Þscal month of the year. Standard deviation of daily excess returns average about 3% in the entire sample. Relative to the twelfth Þscal month, SDDERs are an additional 0.15% higher on average in the fourth Þscal month. This suggests that there is over 5% ( 0.15% 3% ) more volatility in the fourth Þscal month than in the twelfth Þscal month. This difference is statistically signiÞcant at the 1% level. The Þscal months when second and third-quarter earnings announcements are made also have signiÞcantly higher coefficients than the neighboring months and these months are statistically signiÞcantly more volatile than the twelfth Þscal month. An F-test easily rejects the hypothesis that volatility is constant across Þscal months.
Possibly because fourth-quarter announcements are spread out over a longer period, there is no obvious fourth-quarter earnings announcement effect in Table 3 . Though volatility is high in the second Þscal month, the effect is dwarfed by the Þrst-quarter earnings announcement (i.e., fourth Þscal month) coefficient.
Are investors rewarded for the extra volatility and activity around earnings announcements and other events that conform to the Þscal calendar? Ball and Kothari (1991) suggest that investors are rewarded, since they Þnd that abnormal returns around earnings announcements are positive. Table 4 revisits this issue by measuring how average daily excess returns (ADER) vary over the Þscal year. As shown in equation (3), ADER is adjusted for the daily return in the industry, so any calendar effects in returns have been factored out. This adjustment also insures that the average ADER in the broader sample is zero.
The fourth Þscal month is not only the most volatile month, it also has the highest average return. The return in the fourth month is statistically signiÞcantly higher than any other month at the 1% level. However, this excess return is only 0.0074% higher per day than an average month, which implies that the average stock earns an excess return of about 0.15% over the course of the fourth Þscal month. 5 This clearly does not represent an arbitrage opportunity because of transaction costs, but it does suggest there may be a risk premium for the volatility during this month. The fourth and tenth Þscal months, both of which are announcement months, are the only month with returns that are signiÞcantly higher than other months.
In summary, there appears to be something especially "informative" about Þrst-quarter earnings announcements and this leads to the fourth Þscal month being especially volatile. The fourth Þscal month has the highest volatility and the highest average return, when controlling for cal- 
Fiscal Patterns' Influence on Calendar Year Volatility
If Þrms' Þscal years were distributed evenly through the Þscal year, then the Þscal year patterns discussed in the previous section would have no effect on the collective volatility of all stocks throughout the year. However, as Table 1 shows, Þscal years are concentrated in certain times. As a result, the fourth-Þscal-month effect, for example, should make April more volatile than it would otherwise be. This section investigates the importance of Þscal year effects on calendar volatility.
Again, a simple graph captures most of the effect. Figure 2 displays average SDDER's, grouped by Þscal year end, by calendar month. For each Þscal-year-end group, volatility spikes up in January, April, July, and October, which coincides with primary earnings announcement months.
The October spike is particularly noteworthy, since the graph does not remove the underlying calendar trends detailed in Table 3 above. Figure 2 indicates that Þscal year patterns affect calendar seasonality of stock volatility. Table 5 shows the difference between actual and predicted SDDER's, which is the estimated net effect of Þscal year effects on calendar volatility. As expected,
Þscal effects increase volatility in the months with the most announcements -January, February, April, July, and October -while lowering relative volatility in other months. Also as expected since it is the most common fourth Þscal month, Þscal effects have the greatest positive effect on April's volatility. The results in Table 5 conÞrm that the importance of earnings announcements and the clumping of these announcements at certain times leads to measurable, if not huge, increases in stock market volatility at certain times of the year.
Exploring the Role of Analysts
To this point, I have focused on how the timing of information that a Þrm makes public affects the Þrm's stock. However, information about a Þrm's prospects is also regularly released by parties outside the Þrm -namely, Wall Street equity analysts. This section explores how analyst forecasts contribute to the Þscal year patterns uncovered above. I Þrst measure the inter-relationship between forecast revisions and stock volatility. I then explore the seasonal patterns of analyst forecasts and relate these patterns to those uncovered in previous sections.
It is well established that Wall Street analysts affect equity prices in at least two ways. First, changes in analyst recommendations directly inßuence stock prices (see, for example, Stickel (1995) ).
Second, earnings "surprises" are measured in terms of how actual earnings differ from analyst predictions, so the reaction of stock prices to earnings announcements is directly affected by previous analyst forecasts. This suggests that analyst behavior can affect Þscal year patterns in stock returns and volatility both through the fact that analyst estimates contribute to the market's reaction to earnings announcements and through any seasonal patterns that analysts might adhere to in releasing or updating forecasts. The Þrst column of Table 6 reports the results of a regression using the speciÞcation described by equation (4). These coefficients should be interpreted cautiously, however. Unlike the similar regressions with Þrm announcements as explanatory variables, I cannot make a reasonable case that forecast changes are exogenous. While forecasts affect stock returns, often some new piece of information simultaneously affects both a Þrm's stock price and estimates of its future earnings.
So the coefficient on "big" measures the correlation between analyst changes and stock volatility, but is not an attempt to measure the causal effect of analysts on volatility.
As might be expected, stock volatility is signiÞcantly and positively related to big forecast changes. Months where a big forecast change is made have 0.22% higher SDDER than other months, which is very similar to the effect of a typical earnings announcement. The second column of Table 6 repeats the regression from Table 2 on the sample for which analyst forecasts are available and shows that this does not noticeably impact the importance of earnings announcements.
The Þnal column includes both earnings announcements and big forecast changes as explanatory variables. Though big forecast changes are somewhat more likely to occur in months that have earnings announcements, this is not the main factor driving the correlation between forecast changes and volatility. The coefficients on forecast change and earnings announcements are not signiÞcantly affected by each others' inclusion in the regression. This suggests that earnings announcements have a signiÞcant effect on volatility even when they do not dramatically affect analyst expectations and that analysts often make large forecast adjustments based on information other than earnings announcements.
Given that big forecast changes are associated with stock volatility, are there patterns in analyst forecast timing that help explain the Þscal year volatility patterns detailed previously? Table 7 explores this possibility in a very simple manner, by looking at when analysts make new forecasts for entire Þscal years' earnings. 8 That is, the table is limited to forecast changes where Zacks 7 This is an imperfect measure since whether a change qualiÞes as "big" is, in part, a function of how big the forecast was to begin with. However, I reran the analysis using other deÞnitions of "big" that relied on other percentage change hurdles or dollars per share hurdles. The results are not sensitive to the deÞnition of "big."
indicates that the analyst did not have a previous estimate for the Þscal year.
There appears to be both a calendar pattern of analysts releasing new forecasts in March and April, as well as a Þscal year pattern of making initial forecasts around the fourth month of the Þscal year. If initial forecasts were made randomly throughout the year, each month would have 8.33% of forecasts. Note that, for three of the four Þscal year ends listed, the fourth Þscal month has more than its share. The one exception is October for June Þscal year companies. But even in this case, the number of estimates is a peak in a slow season. For each Þscal year end shown, the percentage of estimates made in any given calendar month is highest for the companies for whom that month is the fourth Þscal month. That is, the April peak is highest for December companies since it is their fourth Þscal month and the October lull is least dramatic for June companies. The results of Table 7 are therefore consistent with initial analyst forecasts being "informative" events.
The table also suggests that the concentration of new forecasts in fourth Þscal months helps make this the most volatile month for a Þrm's stock price.
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Most analyst forecast changes are made as the end of a Þscal period approaches. For example, over 60% of changes to the Þscal year earnings forecast are made in the last two months of the Þscal year. Table 8 investigates the timing of such last-minute analyst forecast changes. Column 1 of Table 8 displays analyst forecast revisions in the entire Zacks database for Þscal years 1987
to 1993 that meet two criteria: 1) the forecast is for a single Þscal quarter's earnings, and 2) the forecast was revised at what I will deÞne as the "last-minute" -that is, the forecast was revised in the last two months of the quarter to which it corresponds or it was revised after the quarter had ended. This should capture Þnal updating of forecasts in preparation for the release of earnings.
The data show a striking trend towards more last-minute updates as the Þscal year progresses.
In fact, last-minute fourth quarter revisions are almost 50% more common than last-minute Þrst quarter revisions. 10
Estimates by Value Line are excluded from this section because their analysis is released at regular intervals and provides no analyst discretion over when to update information.
9 When analyzing half-months, I found the second half of the fourth month to be especially volatile. Analysts may contribute to this effect, because most initial forecasts are made towards the end of the month. In fact, over 20% of initial estimates are made in the last two trading days of the month, which suggests that within-month timing of analyst estimates could be partially responsible for the so-called "Turn of the Month Effect." If analysts disproportionately release estimates on Monday, perhaps they also contribute to the "Monday Effect". Table 7 makes it clear, however, that analyst forecast timing is not a major part of the "January Effect."
The other columns of Table 8 break these last-minute revisions out in more detail. Last-minute revisions are roughly evenly split between the next to last month of the quarter, the last month of the quarter, and the period after the quarter ends. While revisions become more likely throughout the year for each of these months, the trend is most distinct in revisions made in the penultimate month of the Þscal quarter. That is, analyst revisions made in the second month of the Þscal quarter to which the estimate corresponds become much more likely as the Þscal year progresses.
Such revisions are 94% more frequent in fourth Þscal quarters than in Þrst Þscal quarters. 
Conclusions and Future Research
The results in this paper conÞrm Chari et al.'s (1988) These results suggest that Þrms' inconsistent release of information over the Þscal year and the timing of equity analyst effort lead to pockets of relatively high volatility. More speciÞc analysis of the effects of this phenomenon could be uncovered with future research. For example, analyst forecasts are disproportionately released near month end, which could be partially responsible for the so-called "End of the Month" anomaly. But while the effects of analyst activity are interesting, studying the causes of their estimate timing may provide an interesting empirical agency analysis.
Perhaps the patterns in analyst estimate timing is a rational response to analysts' or broader Wall Street incentive pay plans. that had annual sales of greater than $10 million in at least four of the years from 1986 to 1995. The second column includes all those Þrms from the Þrst column for whom at least one complete Þscal year of stock data is available, whose primary 4-digit Compustat SIC code contained at least Þve companies in any given included month, and whose primary 2-digit SIC code meet the exclusion criteria discussed in Section 2. Þscal months. For example, a Þrm with a December (June) Þscal year has the seventh-Þscal-month variable equal to 1 (0) in July and seventh-calendar-month variable equal to 1 (1) in July. Standard Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and for within-Þrm autocorrelation. * and ** indicate signiÞcantly different from 0 at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The Þrst column is the actual SDDER for all observations used in the regression in Table 3 .
The second column is the average predicted SDDER for each month based on the regression in Table 3, but with the Þscal effects set equal across all months. Table 2 for details on the speciÞcation. Sample is limited to Þrm-years with analyst coverage in Zacks Þle. "Big Analyst Adjustment" is an indicator variable that equals one if an analyst changed his/her earnings estimate by more than 25% for any Þscal period. Standard Errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and for within-Þrm autocorrelation. * and ** indicate signiÞcantly different from 0 at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. are not included because there is no discretion in when they are released.
